And, that’s pretty much all Congress wrote. Needless
to say, federal circuits diverged on the definitions of
‘‘identified separately from,’’ ‘‘existing independently,’’
and ‘‘intrinsic utilitarian function.’’
The greater consistency that the application of a
single test should achieve will no doubt be welcome by
many in the 3-D printing industry. But the expanded
scope of protection, however more consistently applied,
can be expected to create new risks and opportunities
for the stakeholders in this emerging industry.
How Did We Get Here?
It all started with a lamp sculpture that incorporated
statuettes of male and female dancing figures. The dis-
pute over the extent of the copyrightability of the statu-
ettes made it all the way to the Supreme Court in Mazer
v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954). Mazer ended up setting in
motion the useful articles doctrine, holding that ‘‘artis-
tic articles are protected in form but not their mechani-
cal or utilitarian aspects.’’
Mazer said that ‘‘nothing...support[s] the argument
that the intended use or use in industry of an article eli-
gible for copyright bars or invalidates its registration.’’
It was pretty easy to conceptualize a sculpture sepa-
rately from the cords and bulb of a lamp. The more en-
meshed the aesthetic and useful features become, how-
ever, the more difficult it is to draw the line between the
two.
In the Second Circuit, the test evolved around orna-
mental aspects being ‘‘conceptually separable from
their subsidiary utilitarian function’’ (Kieselstein-Cord
v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989, 993 (2d Cir.
1980)).
This meant that, ‘‘where design elements can be iden-
tified as reflecting the designer’s artistic judgment exer-
cised independently of functional influences, concep-
tual separability exists’’ (Brandir Int’l, Inc. v. Cascade
Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1145 (2d Cir. 1987)).
The Seventh Circuit followed the Second, with nearly
identical analysis: ‘‘If the elements do reflect the inde-
pendent, artistic judgment of the designer, conceptual
separability exists’’ (Pivot Point Int’l, Inc. v. Charlene
Prods., 372 F.3d 913, 931 (7th Cir. 2004)).
If conceptual separability sounded easy, you would
be right at home in the Second or Seventh Circuits. But
if, like many of us, you squinted your eyes and
scratched your head, pondering what in the world it all
means, the Fifth Circuit was on your side. This ‘‘concep-
tual separation continues to flummox federal courts,’’
according to Galiano v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 416
F.3d 411, 419 (5th Cir. 2005).
For ease of application, Galiano held the test to be
satisfied where ‘‘there is substantial likelihood that
even if the article had no utilitarian use it would still be
marketable to some significant segment of the commu-
nity simply because of its aesthetic qualities.’’
There were more tests throughout the circuits, sig-
nificantly arming the litigator’s arsenal. Unfortunately,
this meant considerable uncertainty for many indus-
tries.
Where Are We Now?
Three-D printing industry stakeholders have faced
considerable uncertainty about whether and under
what circumstances useful articles made with this tech-
nology are protected.
Members of the industry banded together to argue to
the Supreme Court, as amici, that ‘‘users of 3-D scan-
ners and cloud sharing platforms cannot be sure
whether they can lawfully create and share digital and
physical 3-D replications of real-life objects.’’
Because the scope of copyright protection for useful
articles is important to many industries—not least of
which are the fashion and the emerging 3-D printing
industries—the court took up the case and articulated a
new standard to identify, in useful articles, separable
aesthetic features subject to protection.
This is the test Star Athletica has given us:
A feature incorporated into the design of a useful article is
eligible for copyright protection only if the feature (1) can
be perceived as a two- or three-dimensional work of art
separate from the useful article, and (2) would qualify as a
protectable pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work—either on
its own or fixed in some other tangible medium of
expression—if it were imagined separately from the useful
article into which it is incorporated.
Prong two of the new standard introduces a concept
that seems to depart from the Section 101 ‘‘existing in-
dependently’’ requirement for the incorporated feature.
Arguably, this standard appears to further erode the di-
viding line between applied art and industrial design,
expanding the scope of copyrightable features.
Some IP scholars have opined that the courts have al-
ready ‘‘abstracted away from the distinction Congress
intended,’’ arguing that, once extracted, the feature
should ‘‘stand alone as an original . . . (PGS work) that
is not a useful article.’’
Echoing this, law professors Christopher Buccafusco
and Jeanne Fromer argued in their amicus brief that
both the Copyright Act and the court ‘‘have long recog-
nized the dangers of allowing creators to use the copy-
right system to receive protection for utilitarian features
....Functionality is more properly channeled to the de-
sign or utility patent systems.’’
Clearly, the court was not as fearful that this decision
would cross the dividing line, but instead gave the use-
ful articles doctrine a new leg to stand on.
By virtue of coming from the Supreme Court, the new
test may introduce greater consistency, but frustrat-
ingly, its application may be as confusing as the pre-
existing circuit law. But it is clear that this test is more
expansive than most of the previous circuit law and
should be more easily satisfied.
The Star Athletica district court found that the chev-
ron patterns and cheerleading uniforms in question
could not be ‘‘physically or conceptually’’ separated un-
der Section 101 ‘‘from the utilitarian function’’ of the
uniform.
Before the Sixth Circuit reversed and the Supreme
Court granted certiorari and decided Star Athletica, this
narrower view of separability under Section 101 was
common in district courts across the country. The dis-
trict courts of the Second Circuit, for example, would
have likely come to a similar conclusion, limiting the
protection of useful articles based on Section 101.
Interestingly, Section 101’s literal language requires
the protectable design feature to be ‘‘capable of existing
independently of the utilitarian aspects.’’ The court’s
test allows for the feature to exist ‘‘either on its own or
fixed in some other tangible medium of expression.’’
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